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Warren and Tricia Osborn, Michael F. Sullivan, David and Cynthia Mirsþ,
Norman Provan, Jeffrey and Nancy Trumper, Gary and Catherine Crittenden, Dave
Checketts and Mount Clyde Fnterprises LC (collectively the "Property Owners,,)
each of whom are property owners of a legally indivisible 160 acre or 184 acre
platted lotr (each shall be referred to herein as a "parcel" or ,,lot,,) at Wolf Creek
Ranch, located in Wasatch County, Utah, hereby submit this Reply Brief of
Appellants and Brief of Cross-Appellees (the lroperty Owners) in answer to the
Brieß of Respondents Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission,') and
Wasatch County ("Wasatch County") and in response to the issues raised in Cross-
Appellant Wasatch County's Brief as they relate to 'Wasatch Countv,s Cross-
Appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGTJMENT RELATED TO
PROPERTY OWNERS APPEAL
As proven herein, the Tax Commission's Brief and Wasatch County's Brief
mischaractetize the sole legal issue presented by the Property Owners' appeal of
the Tax Commission's April 1, 2008 decision (the "Tax Commission Decision,,) as
an appeal of a factual issue. In reality, the Property Owners' appeal challenges
only the legal foundation upon which the Tax Commission Decision rests.
t For purposes of clarity when the difference in the size of a parcel, 160 acres or
184 acres, is immaterial, each shall be referred to as a 160 acre parcel or lot.
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Specifically, the Tax Commission's Brief and Wasatch County's Brief
mischaracterize the ultimate issue of this case by:
(1) misrepresenting the issue before this Court as an issue of fact (choice
and application of property valuation methodology) rather than an issue of law (the
legal boundaries or constraints of a permissible valuation methodology).
Specifically, the ultimate and controlling issue in this case is whether the Tax
Commission can disregard, and effectively rewrite Utah's "fair.market value"
statute, Utah Code Ann. $ 59-2-102(12), which requires that assessment of real
properlry in Utah be made consistent with applicable zoning laws, which in this
instance would include one acre of a legally indivisible 160 acre platted lot at Wolf
Creek Ranch withdrawn from "Farmland Assessment"; and
(2) ignoring applicable zoning laws and manipulating indisputable
material facts to achieve an excessive assessed value of one acre. within the legally
indivisible 160 acre platted lot at Wolf Creek Ranch. Wasatch County's
assessment and the Tax Commission Decision violated zoning laws by allocating a
grossly disproportionate value of the entire 160 indivisible acre lot to the one acre
no longer eligible for "Farmland Assessment," as if such one acre were a "stand-
alone" divisible lot, legally separable from the other 159 acres, and as if each acre
in the lot, except the one acre upon which a home was built, has negligible value.
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While the Tax Commission's Brief refers to "fair market value," the
Commission's Brief significantly, never cites nor quotes the mandatory "fair
market value" statute. The Tax Commission's Brief does not even list the "fair
market value" statute among its "Determinative Statutes." Tax Commission Brief,
p.2. Although the Tax Commission does not deem the "fair market value" statute
as relevant to the valuation and assessment of the subject properly, a fair and
reasonable application of the "fair market value" statute requires that each and
every acre within a legally indivisible 160 acre platted lot be assessed at the same
value.
Similarly, Wasatch County's Brief fails to address the sole issue presented
by the Property Owners' appeal of the Tax Commission Decision ("Appeal"):
whether the Tax Commission Decision violates Utah Code ç59-2-102(12) by
allocating 65Yo of the value of each parcel to the 10 acre building envelope based
solely on a hypothetical sale of a 10 acre portion of the parcel when it is legatly
impossible for such sale to ever occur. It is legally impossible for a sale to occur
because applicable zoning restrictions prohibit any division or separation of any
portion of a Property Owner's parcel. Wasatch County elects instead to argue that
the Tax Commission's Decision to ignore applicable zoning laws in violation Utah
Code ç59-2-102(12),presents afactual issue, therefore mandatingthatthe Properly
Owners' Appeals be dismissed for failing to marshal the evidence.
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SI]MMARY OF'ARGT]MENT RELATED TO
WASATCII COT]NTY'S CROSS.APPEAL
Wasatch County's Cross-Appeal misunderstands the standard of review
applicable to this Court's review of questions of fact. Wasatch County argues that
there was substantial evidence in support of Wasatch County's argument, which
the Tax Commission rejected, that the value of the building rights on each parcel
migrates to the one-acre home site, rather than the ten-acre allowable building
envelope. lVasatch County fails to address, much less demonstrate, that the Tax
Commission Decision, which held that 650/o of the value of the parcel attached to
the ten-acre building envelope, was not supported by substantial evidence. Rather,
Wasatch County urges this Court to reweigh the evidence presented during the Tax
Commission hearing.
In the event this Court rules in favor of the Property Owners, which it must
and should by apptying Utah Code Ann. ç59-2-102(12) (the "fair market value"
statute) in accordance with its plain language, the factual issue (whether the Tax
Commission Decision is supported by substantial evidence) presented in Wasatch
County's cross-appeal becomes moot. The issue is mooted because the legal
requirement for all assessments is that "fair market value" shall be determined
using the current zoning laws, which zoning laws in this case prevent subdivision
of the parcels. Necessarily, therefore, the only legally permissible "methodology"
for valuation of a Property Owner's parcel is to value the entire parcel at its highest
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and best use and multiply such value by 11160 (or l/184) to determine the fair
market value of the one-acre home site. Then, for greenbelt purposes, the entire
parcel must be valued according to its agricultural use and the aggregate must then
be multiplied by 1591160 (or 1831184 as the case may be). Stated simply, valuing
a Proper(y Owner's parcel in any other manner violates the Utah Code and is a
clear legal error.
ARGT]MENT
I. THE TAX COMMISSION'S BRIEF MISREPRESENTS THE
PRIMARY ISSI]E BEFORE THIS COT]RT AS AN ISSUE OF FACT,
WHEN THE PRIMARY ISSUE IS AN ISSUE OF LAW.
A. Statement of the Case
The Tax Commission's "Statement of the Case/Statement of Facts"
essentially repeats and is not inconsistent with the Property Owners' "Factual
Background and Chronology," as stated in the Property Owners' opening brief. In
surnmary, the Property Owners' appeals to the Tax Commission arose from
Wasatch County's "rollback tax" 
. 
assessments for tax year 2006, which
assessments Wasatch Counfy issued to each Property Owner of a legally
indivisible 160 acre platted lot at Wolf Creek Ranch in Wasatch County. The
Property Owners' home and other building improvement assessments are not at
issue. The sole issue is the valuation assessment of the land underneath the home.
The "rollback" tax assessments were and are authorized under the Utah
Farmland Assessment Act, specifically Utah Code Ann. $ 59-2-506, which
483t-3554-84t9.7
imposes a tax on the "fair market value" of land withdrawn from "greenbelt,"
retroactive for five years. This "rollback tax" was imposed when a Property
Owner withdrew an acre (or less) of the Proper{y Owner's lot at Wolf Creek Ranch
from "greenbelt" for construction of certain improvements, typically a home.
The Wolf Creek Ranch subdivision is an approved, platted subdivision in
'Wasatch County. In each instance, the one (or less) acre of land disturbed for
improvement, and hence withdrawn from "Farmland Assessment" or "greenbelt,"
is part of a much larger, indivisible 160 acre (or more) platted lot which a Property
Owner owns. Wasatch County assessed "rollback taxes" and property taxes on the
one (or less) acre improvement site as if the home-site were independent from and
could be assessed ignoring the legal and physical indivisibilit]¡ of the 160 (or more)
acre lot within which the one (or less) acre is a part. and as if each of the other 159
acres has only nominal value.
B. An fssue of Law. Not of Fact
' The Tax Commission and Wasatch County mischaractenze the sole issue
raised in the Property Owners' Appeals as one of fact (valuation methodology)
rather than law (whether the "fair market value" statute permits disregard of zoning
laws in assessing property). Proper characterization of the issue raised in the
Properly Owners' Appeals as one of law or fact is critical. This is because "in
reviewing the Commission's formal adjudicative proceedings, [the appellate
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courts] grant no deference to the Commission's conclusion of law, reviewing them
for correctness. Utah Code Ann. $ 59-1-610(1XbX2006); see also Kennecott
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah L993). [The Utah
appellate courts] do, however, grant deference to the Commission's written
findings of fact, applying the 'substantial evidence standard' on review.' Utah
Code Ann. $ 69-1-610(1)(a)." Dennis Mandell v. Auditing Division of the Utah
State Tax Commission,l36 P.3d 335,33g (Utah 2008).
Both the Tax Commission and 'Wasatch County attempt to twist the issue
presented by the Property Owners' Appeals into an appeal of a valuation
methodology, an inherently factual issue, essentially claimingthat valuation is an
art, not a science subject to rules. In so doing, both the Tax Commission and
Wasatch County fail to acknowledge the legal boundaries and constraints the Utah
Constitution and the Utah Code impose on valuation methodologies and standards.
The Tax Commission and Wasatch County ignore the legal mandate that property
tax assessments are required to meet the standards of uniformity and equality set
forth in the Utah Constitution, and are required to satis$r the standard of "fair
market value, as set forth in the Utah Code. See Utah Const, fut. Xm, $2; Utah
Code Ann. $$ 59-2-102(12) and 59-2-103(1). The Tax Commission and Wasatch
County nonsensically assert that the Tax Commission's adopted valuation
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methodology, which violates the Utah Constitution and goveming stafutes, is an
issue of fact, and is therefore entitled to deference.
To the contrary, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that decisions
of administrative agencies, such as the Tax Commission, must accord with
goveming statutes and the Utah Constitution. Hence, assessment of property in
conformity with constitutional and statutory law is not optional, as 'Wasatch
County and the Tax Commission argue. See, e.g., Crossroøds Plaza Ass'n. v.
Pratt, 912 P.2d 96I, 965 (Utah 1996X"It is a longstanding principle of
administrative law that an agency's rules [andlor valuation methodology] must be
consistent with its governing statutes. . . Furthet, an administrative rule out of
harmony or in conflict with the express provisions of a statute would in effect
amend the statute"). In this case, the Tax Commission Decision ignores and
violates, rather than accords with, governing law, and therefore it is particularly
specious to argue that such is entitled to deference.
The valuation methodology adopted in the Tax Commission Decision
assumes applicable zoning ordinances on the subject propert]¡ do not exist.
Disregard of zoning ordinances applicable to the property being valued is not
simply an optional valuation methodology entitled to deference. Exactly the
opposite is true. The statutory definition of "fair market value" expressly provides
that the applicable zoning restrictions and constraints must be applied in
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determining value. In the present case, the zoning laws and ordinances applicable
to Properly Owners' Wolf Creek Ranch lots do not permit the sale. conveyance or
separation of a one-acre home site from the other 159 acres that constitute the
legally platted 160 acre lot. Accordingly. there is no legally permissible way to
determine the !'fair market value" of the 160 acre lot other than on an equal per
acre (or pro rata) basis. Each and every acre in the single and legally indivisible lot
must have a "fair market value" equal to each and every other acre as a matter of
law. No higher assessed value can be concentrated on any single acre, as the Tax
Commission has unlawfully done. SeePetitíoner Brie f,p.23.
C. The Tax Comr-nission's Illesal Valuation Methodology
The Utah Supreme Court has further held that "all property shall be valued,
for the purposes of assessment, as near as is reasonably practicable, at its full cash
value; in other words, that the valuation for assessment and taxation shall be, as
near as reasonably practicable, equal to the cash price for which the property
valued would sell in the open market, for this is doubtless the correct test of the
value of property." Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Bd. of
Equalization, 110 P.3d 69I, 698 (Utah 2005). In other words, property must be
assessed at"fair market value."
As noted in the Summary of Argument section of this briet both the Tax
Commission's Brief and 'Wasatch County's Brief ignore the "fair market value"
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statute by assuming fair market value is solely a factual determination entitled to
deference. Yet by its plain language, the "fair market value" statute establishes the
mandatory legal framework in which all real property in Utah must be valued and
assessed. The "fair market value" statute, Utah Code Ann. $ 59-2-102(I2), defines
"fairmarket value" as:
the amount at which property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
, being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both: having reasonable knowledge of tho relevant facts. For
putposes of taxation, "fair market value" shall be
determined using the current zoning laws applicable
to the property in question, except in cases where there
is a reasonable probability of a change in the zoning laws
affecting that property in the tax year in question and the
change would have an appreciable influence upon the
value.
(Emphasis added.)
Note that the "fair market value" statute is based upon an exchange value of
the property at issue. In this case, it is indisputable that the "current zoning laws
applicable to the properly in question," specificatly that the. minimum lot size is
160 acres categorically preclude the sale of one acre subdivisions of the lot. Any
sale or exchange (hypothetical or actual) can only be of the entire 160 acre platted
lot. Hence, in valuing a single acre of the indivisible 160 acre platted lot, these
mandatory zontng laws must be recognized and cannot be violated in determining
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the "fair market value" of one indivisiblepart of the 160 acres in a Wolf Creek
Ranch lot.
The Tax Commission states that "the one-acre home site within the parcel
must be separately valued under tþe pA.l{ [Farmland Assessment Act], because the
one-acre home site is no longer eligible for Farmland Assessment." Tax
Commission Brief, p. 12. While such statement is true as a general proposition, it
is misleading ü this case. The fair market value of the one-acre home site must be
valued in accordance with its highest and best use at "fair market value," which
can be no different than the highest and best use of the entire indivisible parcel of
which the one acre is a 1/I60thpart. The undisturbed 159 acres of the indivisible
parcel likewise have the same highest and best use. The fact that the 159 acres are
subject to the Farmland Assessment Act does not change their highest and best use
and associated fair market value. Application of the Farmland Assessment Act
simply means that 159 acres of the indivisible lot will be taxed in accordance with
its agricultural use value, not its highest and best use value. - The significance of
that indisputable legal premise is that while a separate value must be identified for
the one-acre home site as compared to the remaining acreage, this does not mean
that the one acre portion of the parcel (taxed in accordance with its highest and best
use) and the remaining 159 acre portion of the parcel (taxed in accordance with its
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agricultural use) can somehow be valued independently by assuming that they are
legally divisible, as the Tax Commission and'Wasatch County argue.
Both the Tax Commission and Wasatch County misinterpret the term
"separately valued" as meaning that the one-acre home site must be valued
independently from the indivisible whole, by assuming and comparing the one-acre
home site to incomparable one-acre home sites that are legally separate and
divisible. Such interpretation violates the Utalr Constitution, the Utah Code and
the purpose of the Farmland Assessment Act. This interpretation ignores
applicable zoning law and values certain rights that the Property Owners' do not
possess--the right to subdivide and funher develop the parcel, Because no
Property Owners' parcel can be legally subdivided or further developed, it is clear
that the one-acre home site does not have a value independent of the remaining
acreage and visa versa. The "hypothetical sale between a willing buyer and a
willing seller" upon which the Tax Commission Decision is supposedly based is
legally impossible and surely is beyond an appropriate valuation methodology
within which the Tax Commission may exercise its discretion.
Both the Tax Commission and 'Wasatch County misconstrue Utah Code
:
Ann. ç59-2-507(2), which provides:
All structures which are located on land in agricultural
use, the farmhouse and the land on which the farmhouse
is located, and land used in connection with the
farmhouse, shall be valued, assessed, and taxed using
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the same standards, methods, and procedures that
apply to other taxable structures and other land in the
county.
Ut¿h Code Ann. 559-2-507(2) (emphasis added).
Both the Tax Commission and Wasatch County interpret this statute to mean
that land withdrawn from agricultural use can be valued as if such land was
separate and distinct from the parcel of which it forms a part. Noticeably absent
from the plain language of the above quoted statute is any language providing
authority to treat withdrawn land as an independent stand-alone parcel in valuing
such withdrawn land. Indeed, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. ç59-2-507(2)
unequivocally mandates that withdrawn land must b_e valued, assessed and taxed
using the same standards, methods and procedures that apply to other land in the
county. Therefore, unless Wasatch County's usual assessment and valuation
method is to ignore and violate zoning laws in assessing properly, the one-acre
home site cannot be treated as a stand-alone parcel for purposes of valuation and
assessment.
Further, 'Wasatch County argues that the Farmland Assessment Act and the
"fair market value" stafute are inconsistent. While, as demonstrated above, such
argument is demonstrably false, if there is any ambiguity or inconsistency between
Utah Code Ann. 559-2-102(12) (requiring that fair market value be determined in
accordance with existing zoning laws) and Utah Code Arm. 59-2-507(2) (requiring
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that land excluded from assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act is valued
using the same standards, methods, and procedures that apply to other taxable
structures), then such ambiguity or inconsistency must be construed in favor of the
taxpayer, in this case the Property Owners.
This is because the Farmland Assessment Act is not a tax exemption statute,
but, as the Utah Supreme Court has held, is a tax imposition statute. Wasatch Bd.
Equalizationv. State TØc Comm.,g44P.2d,370,373(Utah lggT). While it is true
that the Farmland Assessment Act does provide for preferential tax treatment, it
clearly does not exempt the Property Owners from property taxes. Indeed, the
Farmland Assessment Act, including the provisions related to rollback taxes,
impose a property tax, which is calculated in accordance with the land's
agricultural use value.
In Utah, "our practice is to construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of the
taxpayer,leaving it to the legislature to clariff utr intent to be more restrictive if
such intent exists.'' Salt Lahe County v. State Tax Comm'n, 779 P.zd, t ti t, ll32
(Utah 1989). While it is true that the Farmland Assessment Act does provide
preferentialtax treatment for land that qualifies for agricultural use, the Act clearly
cannot and does not undermine the "fair market value" statutory and constitutional
standard for assessing property in Utah.
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Moreover, the Tax Commission's and Wasatch County's interpretation of
the term "separately valued" distorts both the law and the facts. Initially, the Tax
Commission claims that "the Owners do not ask that their parcels be valued at fair
market value." Tax Commission Brief, p. L2. That is a misrepresentation of the
Property Owners' position, which is precisely the opposite. It is the Tax
Commission and Wasatch County, and not the Properly Owners, which seek to
have the building envelope or a portion thereof valued as a separ ate parcel that
does not and cannot exist, in violation of the "fair market value" stafutory mandate.
To justiff its disregard of applicable zontng laws, which preclude the
divisibility of an indivisible 160 acre plaffed lot, the Tax Commission initia_lly
argues that when land, in this instance one acre of a legally indivisible 160 acre lot,
is withdrawn from application of the Farmland Assessment Act, Utah Code Ann.
$ 59-2-503, the withdrawn land is subject to a "rollback tax." Id. at 13. The
Property Owners do not dispute that initial premise. Both the Tax Commission
and Wasatch County attempt to confuse the issue because "rollback taxes" are not
relevant to this appeal.
From that undisputed point, the Tax Commission claims that "[S]ince the
home site is only a small portion of the parcel, its value must be separately
identified." Id. That is a misleading statement. The Tax Commission misstates the
issues to be decided by falsely assuming the one acre lot in question is a separate
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lot, and not an indivisible part of a legally indivisible lot. Quoting Board of
Equalization Salt Lake County v. Benchmark, 864 P.2d 882 (Utah 1993), the Tax
Commission notes that "section 59-1-103(1) contemplates nothing more than a
hypothetical sale to a hypothetical buyer." Id. af. t4. Assuming a hypothetical
buyer, however, does not and cannot mean that the Tax Commission is at liberty to
assume away the mandatory zoning ordinances applicable to all Wolf Creek Ranch
lots. Moreover.the "hypothetical sale" must be one that can legally occur in the
real world. There is absolutely no language or even an implication in the Farmland
Assessment Act to the contrary.
For example, if a parcel of property is zoned for residential use only, but
such property's highest and best use is a commercial use, it is indisputable that a
county cannot ignore such zoning restriction and value such property in accordance
with its coÍtmercial use. This is precisely what the Tax Commission has done in
this case. The Properfy Owners' do not have the right to subdivide their property
because it is zoned P-160, yet the Tax Commission has valued the right to
subdivide the 160 acre platted lot and in doing so is impermissibly valuing rights
that the Property Owners do not possess, and, in effect, devaluing the other
inseparable acres, which the Property Owners testified was the primary motivation
for their purchase of the 160 acre lot. .
4831-3554-84t9.7 t6
Neither of the "Determinative Statutes" the Tax Commission lists in its
Briet specifically Utah Code Ann. $ 59-2-507(1) and (2), which itemize the
identifiable characteristics of agricultural use, auth orize a disregard of the "fair
market value" statute and its requirement that applicable zoning ordinances must
be applied in valuing land withdrawn from agricultural assessment. Neither is
there any language in the "rollback tax" statute, Utah Code Ann. $ 59-2-506,
which is not applicable to this appeal, that authorizes a disregard of the "fair
market value" stafute. The "rollback tax" stafute simply provides that any change
in land use or other withdrawal of land from agricultural use valuation subjects the
land to the "rollback tax."
A hypothetical sale, which the Utah Supreme Court has recognized as
standard appraisal methodology, does not permit hypothetical disregard of
mandatory zoning laws. Nor can a legitimate hypothetical sale be a sale that is
tegally impossible or impermissible. That is why the Tax Commission's Decision
is fundamentally flawed. As Law Professor David Thomas, whose expertise is
properfy law, testified, "Here [in this case] the essential relevant [and undisputed]
fact is that the only transaction possible between a willing buyer and a willing
seller is for the entire 160-acre tract. This land cannot be separated from or treated
differently from the rest of the 160-acres." Thomas Report, R. at 000876.
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il. THE TAX COMMISSION'S BRIEF AND WASATCH COUNTY'S
BRIEF F'URTHER DISTORT THE FACTS BY CLAIMING THERE
\ryAS INSUFF'ICIENT EVIDENCE TO VALUE ONE ACRE AS AN
INDIVISIBLE PART OF THE WHOLE.
The Tax Commission begins the second major argument of its brief by
stressing that the choice of valuation method, and "the resulting determination of
market value is a question of fact" to which this Court must give deference. Tax
Commission Brief p. 17, quoting Beaver County v WilTel, lnc.,995 P.zd, GOz
(Utah 2000). Similarly, Wasatch County attempts to characteÅzethe allocation of
value to the one-acre home site and the remaining acreage as merely a choice of
valuation method. While it is true that the choice of a valuation methodology
involves a facfual determination, that determination, as conclusively proven in the
Property Owners' Argument I above, must be within the legal constraints of the
"fat market value" statute, which the Tax Commission has ignored.
Again, Wasatch County misstates the issue presented by the Property
Owners' Appeals by stating that, "the Petitioners' arguments for a pro rata
allocation are factually barred." Wasatch County Brief p. 19. The Property
Owners' are NOT arguing that the Tax Commission should have selected a
different valuation methodology than the one chosen. Rather the Property Owners'
assert that the Tax Commission committed legal effor by assuming for purposes of
valuing the one-acre home site that the parcels are legally separate and divisible,
which is in direct contravention of existingzoninglaws.
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Further, because the parcels are legally indivisible and under Utah law this
fact cannot be merely hypothesized away, the only legally permissible manner by
which to determine the value of the one-acre home site and the remaining acreage
is by valuing the entire 160 acre parcel in accordance with its highest and best use
and multiply such value by 1/160 (or 1/184 as the case may be) to determine the
fair market value of the one-acre home site. Then, for "greenbelf' purposes, the
entire parcel must be valued according to its agricultural use and such value must
then be multiplied by 159/160 (or 183/184 as the case may be). Stated simply,
valuing the Property Owners' parcels in any other manner violates the Utah Code
and represents a clear legal eïïor.
The Tax Commission then claims it "allocated the fair market value of the
parcel based upon the known characteristics of the one-acre home site." Id. at 18.
That is a demonstrably false claim. The Tax Commission does recite some
(atthough largely irrelevant) facts, such as the "evidence showed that properties
[are] subject to a conservation easement or properties with no building rights and
limited to recreational or agricultural use had lower value than properties with
building rights." Id. However, the Tax Commission never mentions the
indisputable fact that the building rights in the 160 acre lot do not exist absent the
legalty inseparable acreage of the other 150 acres upon which nothing can lawfully
be built. Nor can the so-called 10 acre building envelope be separated or sold
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independently from the non-buildable acres. Rather the Tax Commission,
assuming alegal and factual fiction, concentrates the undisputed value of the 160
acte platfed lot on the lO-acre building envelope, including the one-acre building
site because the Tax Commission, again in disregard of the evidence, apparently
concludes that building envelopes are always more valuable than non-building
envelopes. The only disagreement between the Tax Commission and Wasatch
County onthis point is that the Tax Commission allocated650/o of a $1.3 to $1.8
million lot value to the 10 acre building envelope, whereas 'Wasatch County
allocated solely to the one (or less) acre upon which the home was built
Economist Dr. Robert Crawford testified "for comparability [valuation
methodology pu{poses] using a I acre wholeþiece as a comparable for a 1 acre
moment/partto estimate its 'market value' is invalid, since by design, the subject
part is purposely, and distinctly not comparable to any similarly sized saleable
whole I the indivisibte 160 lot]." Crawford Expert Witness Report, p.3,Record
000862. Dr. Crawf-ord's testimony was uncontradicted. Stated simply, the 150
acre portion of the 160 acre parcel does not and cannot have a value independent of
the 10 acre portion of the 160 acre parcel and visa versa.
In essence, both the Tax Commission and Wasatch County urge this Court to
adopt a valuation methodology that is inconsistent with Utah law and the Utah
Constitution. If some properties within the state are required to be valued in
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accordance with existing zoning laws, while others can be valued by hypothesizing
such zoning laws away and incorporating into such valuations the value of
intangible rights which the property owner does not possess, ttren clearly property
within the state will not be valued at a uniform and equal rate. Such a scenario
clearly violates the statutory definition of "fair market value" and Article XIII,
Section 2 of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the only legally permissible manner
of valuing different portions of the Properly Owners' parcels is as set forth above.
III. \ryASATCH COT]NTY. RATHER THAN DEMONSTRATING THAT
THE TAX COMMISSION DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SI]BSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, INAPPROPRIATELY TIRGES THIS
COT'RT TO REWEIGH THE EVIDENCE IN ITS FAVOR.
Wasatch County's Cross-Appeal fails to marshal the evidence in support of
the Tax Commission Decision. Instead Wasatch County attempts to persuade this
Court there was substantial evidence in support of the County's argumenf, which
the Tax Commission rejected, that the value of the building and development rights
on each parcel migrates to the one-acre home site, rather than the ten-acre building
envelope.
The Property Owners stress that in the event this Court rules in the Property
Owners' favor with respect to their Appeals, which must occur if the Court applies
Utah Code Ann. ç59-2-102(12) in accordance with its plain language, the County's
paramount issue - whether the Tax Commission Decision is supported by
substantial evidence - becomes moot. The areuments that the Propeúy Ovvners
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here present under Argument III in this brief in opposition to 'lVasatch Countv's
cross-appeal are made in the alternative.
Under the substantial evidence standard of review, this Court will uphold the
Tax Commission's factual determinations so long as there is sufficient evidence to
support its findings. See County Bd. of Equalization v. Stíchting Mayflower
Recreational Fonds, 2000 UT 57, T 11, 6 P.3d 559. This Court, when reviewing
agency decisions, does not reweigh the evidence, nor substitute its conclusions for
that of the agency. See Questør Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,850 P.Zd
1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). Further, this Court will not disturb an agency's findings
simply because another conclusion can be drawn from the evidence. See Whitear
v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct.App. 1998).
As applied to \Masatch County's cross-appeal, Wasatch County fails to
establish that the Tax Commission Decision was not supported by substantial
evidence. As demonstrated below, the Tax Commission Decision, albeit a decision
violative of Utah law, was in conformity with the evidence. On the other hand,
Wasatch County urges this Court to substitute its own conclusions from such
evidence. Clearly, reweighing evidence and substituting conclusions is not the
task before this Court. Therefore, 'Wasatch County's cross-appeal must be denied.
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fV. WASATCH COT]NTY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
WIIICH IS ST]BSTANTIAL, SUPPORTING THE TAX
COMMISSION DECISION;
Wasatch County failed to satisff its marshalling duty by failing to present
substantial evidence, which supports the Tax Commission Decision. To satis$r the
marshalling duty:
Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order
to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at
trial, which supports the very findings the appellant
resists."'
Utah R. App. P. 24 (Advisory Committee Note) (citations omitted).
The Tax Commission Decision. which held that 65Yo of the value of the
parcel attached to the ten-acre building envelope, is supported by the following
evidence, which Wasatch County omits from its Brief:
l. Each of the Property Owners' parcels contained a ten-acre building
envelope. (R. at 1426-1432).
2. Wasatch County's witness, Blaine Hales, testified that he valued the
building rights in determining the value of the one-acre home site. Id.
3. The building rights , that allegedly justified attaching a higher value to
the ten-acre portion of the parcel, attached not just to the one-acre home site, but
rather to the ten acre building envelope. (Id.; R. 001371)
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The factual determination that forms the basis of 'Wasatch County's cross-
appeal is that it was improper for the Tax Commission to allocat e 65Yoof the value
of the entire parcel to the ten-acre building envelope on each parcel, rather than
solely to the one-acre home site. The Tax Commission Decision states:
From review of Mr. Hales' appraisal, his testimony at the
hearing regarding the lO-acre building site and that of the
other witnesses describing the potential for the lO-acre
building envelope, the Commission concludes that the
65Yo for the buildable portion applies to the 10 buitdable
acres and is not appropriately limited to a one-acre home
site.
(R.000064).
This essential factual finding, which forms the sole basis of Wasatch
County's cross-appeal, is supported by substantial evidence presented by Wasatch
County's own witnesses. Rather than attempt to present such evidence, Wasatch
County instead elects to ignore it completely and urges this Court to adopt Wasatch
County's position, which was not even supported by 'Wasatch County's own
witnesses at the hearing.
For example, Glen Burgener, the Wasatch County Assessor, testified as
follows:
Mr. Burgener: In going over it, talking as a group about
the effects of the conservation easement and development
rights and the 10 acre area of disturbance, and the
conclusion was that the value 
- 
the bulk of the value
should be in the area that can be disturbed...
:
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(R. 001371)
Mr. Burgener did testiff further that he would allocate the bulk of value to
the one-acre home site, but could provide no justification for doing so. (R.
001371-001373).
Mr. Hales, another Wasatch County Witness, when questioned by the Tax
Commission testified as follows:
(Tax Commissioner Marc JohTson) Mr. Johnson:
Okay great. Now did 
- 
as I listened to your testimony
and 
- 
um 
- 
perused your appraisal, you looked at one
acre and 159 acres. You didn't look at the 10 acre
envelope.
Mr. Hales: You know, if it would have been my choice,
I probably would've gone with l0 acres and said one, but
the county [Wasatch County] told me that their standard
was one acre. And so-
Mr. Johnson: Okay.
Mr. Hales: I wanted to be consistent with what the
assessor had been doing.,
Mr. Johnson: So 
- 
so if I understand that correctly, then
if you had been asked 
- 
a change of an assignment- and
I don't know how to find that, but you would 
- 
in doing
an allocation, you would have allocated value to 10
acres?
Mr. Hales: 'Well, I probably would have chosen a liftle
bit larger parcel. But it's so difficult because with the
assessment, to know, if they put a bam on it to know 
-
you can't 
- 
...the county's decision to go with one acre
was fine with me.
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Mr. Johnson: Not even making that assumption, would
- 
would you have broken it down to one acre, l0 acre
components or would you have valued outside of the
greenbelt statute just the entire 160 acres
Mr. Hales: If someone had asked me to just break out
the components, I probably would have just looked at it
legally and not even worried about the physical aspect of
it. You know, I would've said this is what the building
right is worth...
Mr. Johnson: ...don't let me force words into your
mouth, but it appears to me you would not have
appraised a one acre parcel of land, would that be
correct?
Mr. Hales: I think that's correct. I think neither one of
us actually appraised a one acre parcel. Both parties
were trying to come to what hopefully what would be a
reasonable allocation for that component of property
Mr. Johnson: So you've allocated value to one acre of
land?
Mr. Hales: With the building rights included.
Mr. Johnson: So this 
- 
these are my words 
- 
you are
essentially allocating one of the sticks in the bundle of
rights to an acre of land?
Mr. Hales: Those would be my words too.
(R. 00144s-001450).
Mr. Hales, Wasatch County's own witness, testified that in attempting to
value the one-acre home site, he valued the building rights and the building rights
increased the value of the one-acre home site. It is undisputed that the building
rights atfach to the entire ten-acre building envelope. There was no testimony or
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other evidence explaining why the value of the building rights should be allocated
to a single acre, when up to ten acres of land (the building envelope) are available
for buildings and improvements. When questioned, Mr. Hales testified that, "You
know, if it would have been my choice, I probably would've gone with 10 acres
and said one, but the county [Wasatch County] told me that their standard was one
acre. Andso" Id.
Curiously Wasatch County did not think any of.this testimony provided any
evidentiary support for the Tax Commission Decision, and therefore failed to even
to present it. The testimony of Wasatch County's own witnesses at the Tax
Commission hearing repudiate Wasatch County's appellate brief before this Court.
Clearly, it is undisputed that the building rights, which formed the sole basis
for disproportionately valuing the ten-acre building envelop e, attached to all ten-
acres of the building envelope, not just the value of the one acre (or less) home
site. Moreover, 'Wasatch County provided no evidence justi$ring the allocation of
the value of such building rigtrts to a single acre. The Tax Commission based its
Decision solely on Wasatch County's Witnesses and evidence, which indeed
provided substantial evidence in support of the Tax Commission's Decision.
\Masatch County failed to marshal the evidence presented above, failed to
demonstrate that the Tax Commission Decision was not supported by substantial
evidence, but rather merely argues that this Court should reweigh the evidence in
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its favor even though there was no evidence presented to support its position that
the entire value of the building rights attached to the one-acre (or less) home site.
For these reasons Wasatch County's cross-appeal must be dismissed.
V. WASATCH COT]NTY FT]RTHER ARGUES THAT IT \ryAS
ST]BSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED BY THE TAX COMMISSION
DECISION. \ilHEN IN FACT IT IS THE PROPERTY O\ryNERS
WHO \ilERE ST]BSTANTIALLY PREJT]DICED.
Wasatch County argues it was substantiatly prejudiced because the Tar
l
Commission Decision "artificially reduces the value of the homes sites"'thereby
improperly shifting the property fax burden among the population. \Masatch
'County's argument is inappropriate and ignores reality. The effect of the Tax
Commission Decision is to improperly shift value from the 159 acre part of a lot at
Wolf Creek Ranch subject to the Farmland Assessment Act to the one-acre home
site, which home site is not subject to the Act. The true effect of Wasatch
County's improper shift is to artificially increase the property tax burden imposed
on the Property Owners, and thereby violate the fundamental purpose of the
Fdrmland Assessment Act. The Farmland Assessment Act is intended to slow
development, and prevent the loss of farm land by imposing a property tax upon
land subject to the Act in accordance with its agricultural use value, instead of the
prevailing market value. By ignoring existing zoning laws, the Tax Commission
Decision shifts the value of the Property Owners' parcels to land that is not subject
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to the Farmland Assessment Act, thereby increasing the valuation of such portion
of the parcels to 256 times its value.
Wasatch County has not, nor could it legitimately, challenge the Property
Owners' eligibility for assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act. Instead
Wasatch County seeks to negate the revenue loss caused by the application of the
Farmland Assessment Act by attempting to migrate nearly the entire value of the
entire 160 acre parcel to the single acre home site not subject to the Act.
Wasatch County is politically free to oppose the Farmland Assessment Act.
V/hile Wasatch County may not support the Farmland Assessment Act because it
reduces properly tax revenues, the purpose of the Farmland Assessment Act cannot
be violated by using valuation sophistries to shift the vast majority of the value of a
single 160 acre parcel of land from land subject to the Farmland Assessment Act to
land that has been withdrawn from agricultural use (not subject to Act).
While it may be Wasatch County's subjective belief that the Properly
Ownersl are not paying sufficient taxes because their parcels are undervalued,
Wasatch County's subjective belief is irrelevant to an appropriate adjudication of
this Appeal. The Property Owners' parcels must be valued, assessed and taxed in
accordance with Utah law. If Wasatch County's subjective belief is that Utah law
is unfair in this regard, the County is free to seek relief through legislative
amendment, but must do so in the Utah Legislature, not before this Court.
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Indeed, if subjective belief were relevant, it is undisputed that the Property
Owners each pay more than their fair share of property taxes, if such taxes are
compared to the basic benef,rts each Properly Owner receives from Wasatch
County. A substantial and undisputed properly tax is imposed upon the structures
(home and improvements) and each acre of land which each Properly Owner owns.
Such properly taxes amount to a windfall for Wasatch County as: (1) the
Property Owners do not have children in Wasatch County schools; (2) the Property
Owners generally do not receive any services from Wasatch County because all
services are performed by their home owners' association at the sole expense of the
Properfy Owners, including the original construction and paving of all roads, all
repair and maintenance of the roads, all snow removal and keeping the roads open
for travel, fire department services (home owner's association has 3 fire vehicles),
weed control, full-time security; and (3) the majority of the Property Owners are
present in the state for less than few weeks a year. They do not, therefore, use the
local roads, benefit from m.osquito abatement or'Wasatch County facilities, each of
which is paid for with property tax revenues.t 1R. 001463-001468)
t Mr. Douglas Anderson, the "primary develop eÍ" atWolf Creek Ranch testified at
the Tax Commission hearing, "The homeowners association is repairing those
[roads] currently [April 2I,2008]. And when they need to be replaced, resurfaced,
or taken out and rebuilt, it will be the homeowners association that pays for all of
that." Record at 001493.
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Correct or not, tax policy is not within the province of the judiciary.
Therefore if a change to the tax policy of the state is desired by one or more of the
parties to this appeal, such change MUST be sought in the legislature.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of law, the Tax Commission's Decision must be reversed
because it violates the statutorily and constitutionally mandated assessment of
property at "fair market value," which requires that assessment of property be
"determined using current zoning laws applicable to the property in question,"
Utah Code Ann. $ 59-2-102(12), and not in disregard of such laws. The Tax
Commission Decision disregards the "fair market value" statute and the zoning
laws applicable to the Wolf Creek Ranch parcels because it concentrates value on
less than the entire acreage when the applicable zoning laws preclude the sale or
exchange of any part or subcomponent of the 160 acre platted lot.
Hence, this Court should reverse the Tax Commission's Decision and
require Wasatch Çounty to value the Property Owners' parcels in-the only legally
permissible manner, which is to value the entire 160 acre platted parcel at its
highest and best use and multiply such value by the percentage such portion bears
to the total acreage.
The purpose of the Farmland Assessment Act is to slow development and
farm loss by taxing land subject to the Farmland Assessment Act in accordance
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with its agricultural use value instead of the prevailing market value. The Tax
Commission Decision ftustrates this purpose by illegally shifting the value of the
building rights to a one-acre part of the parcel even though legally a minimum of
160 acres is required in order to have a single home site. In fact, according to the
Tax Commission Decision, the one-acre home site has a value 256 times greater
than the remaining acreage regardless of the fact that all 160 acres are legally
required to have a building right at all. It is clear that Wasatch County does not
support the Farmland Assessment Act, but it should not be allowed to do an end
around the Farmland Assessment Act by arbitrarily increasing the value of the land
withdrawn from the Farmland Assessment Act, all of which is contained within an
indivisible platted parcel, to make up for the property taxes its perceives have been
lost as a result of the taxation under the Farmland Assessment Act. If V/asatch
County seeks to repeal the Farmland Assessment Act, it must seek to do so in the
Utah Legislature, not this Court.
- 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROWSIONS
Utah Constitution Arficle Xlll, Section 2. [Property tax.]
(1) So that each person and corporation pays atax in proportion to the fair market
value of his, her, or its tangible property, all tangible properry in the State that is
not exempt under the laws of the United States or under this Constitution shall be:
(a) assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its fair market value,
to be ascertained as provided by law; and
(b) taxedat a uniform and equal rate.
(2) Each corporation and person in the State or doing business in the State is
subject to taxation on the tangible properly owned or used by the corporation or
person within the boundaries of the State or local authority levying the tax.
(3) The Legislature may provide by statute that land used for agricultural pu{poses
be assessed based on its value for agricultural use.
(a) The Legislature may by statute determine the manner and extent of taxing
livestock.
(5) The Legislature may by statute determine the manner and extent of taxing or
exempting intangible property, except that any property tax on intangible property
may not exceed .005 of its fair market value. If any intangible properfy is taxed
under the property tax, the income from that properf may not also be taxed.
(6) Tangible personal property required by law to be registered with the State
before it is used on a public highway or waterwäy, on public land, or in the air may
be exempted from properly tax by statute. If the Legislature exempts tangible
personal propefy from properly tax under this Subsection (6), it shall provide for
the payment of uniform statewide fees or uniform statewide rates of assessment or
taxation on that property in lieu of the properfy tax. The fair market value of any
property exempted under this Subsection (6) shall be considered part of the State
tax base for determining the debt limitation under Article XIV.
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59-2-503. Qualifications for agricultural use assessment.
(1) For general properlry tax purposes, land may be assessed on the basis of the
value that the land has for agricultural use if the land:
(a) is not less than five contiguous acres in area, except that land may be
assessed on the basis of the value that the land has for agricultural use:
(i) if:
(A) the land is devoted to agricultural use in conjunction with
other eligible acreage; and
(B) the land and the other eligible acreage described in
Subsection (1)(a)(i)(A) have identical legal ownershipi or
(ii) as provided under Subsection (4); and
(b) except as provided in Subsection (5):
(i) is active_ly devoted to agricultural use; and
(ii) has been actively devoted to agricultural use for at least two
successive years immediately preceding the taxyear for which the land is
being assessed under this part.
(2) I" determining whether land is actively devoted to agricultural use, production
per acre for a given county or area and a given type of land shall be determined by
using the first applicable of the following:
(a) production levels reported in the current publication of the Utah
Agricultural Statistics;
(b) cunent crop budgets developed and published by Utah State University;
and
(c) other acceptable standards of agricultural production designated by the
commission by rule adopted in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(3) Land may be assessed on the basis of the land's agricultural value if the land:
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(a) is subject to the privilege tax imposed by Section 59-4-l0l;
(b) is owned by the state or any of the state's political subdivisions; and
(c) meets the requirements of Subsection (1).
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (1)(a), the commission or a county board of
equalization may grant a waiver of the acreage limitation for land upon:
(a) appeal by the owner; and
(b) submission of proof that:
(i) 80% or more of the owner's, purchaser's, or lessee's income is
derived from agricultural products produced on the properly in question; or
(ii) (A) the failure to meet the acreage requirement arose solely as a
result of an acquisition by a governmental entity by:
(I) eminent domain; or
(II) the threat or imminence of an eminent domain proceeding;
(B) the land is actively devoted to agricultural use; and
(C) no change occurs in the ownership of the land.
(5) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1)(b), the-commission or a county board of
equalization may grant a waiver of the requirement that the land is actively devoted
to agricultural use for the tax year for which the land is being assessed under this
part upon:
(i) appeal by the owner; and
(ii) submission of proof that:
(A) the land was assessed on the basis of agricultural use for at
least two years immediately preceding that taxyear; and
(B) the failure to meet the agricultural production requirements
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for that tax year was due to no fault or act of the owner, purchaser, or
lessee.
(b) As used in Subsection (5)(a), "fault" does not include:
(i) intentional planting of crops or trees which, because of the
maturation period, do not give the owner, purchaser, or lessee a
reasonable opportunþ to satisff the production levels required for
land actively devoted to agricultural use; or
(ii) imptementation of a bona fide range improvement program, crop
rotation program, or other similar accepted cultural practices which do
not give the owner, purchaser, or lessee a reasonable opportunity to
satis$ the production levels required for land actively devoted to
agricultural use.
59-2-506. Rollback tax -- Penalty -- Computation of tax -- Procedure -- Lien
-- Interest -- Notice -- Collection .- Distribution -- Appeal to county board of
equalization.
(1) Except as provided in this section, Section 59-2-506.5, or Section 59-2-511, if
la-nd is withdrawn from this part, the land is subject to a rollback tax imposed in
accordance with this section.
(2) (") An owner shall notiff the county assessor that land is withdrawn from this
part within 120 days after the day on which the land is withdrawn from this part.
(b) An owner thatfails to notiff the county assessor under Subsection (2)(a)
that land is withdrawn from this part is subject to a penalty equal to the greater of:
(i) $10; or
(1i) 2% of the rollback tax due for the last year of the rollback period.
(3) (u) The county assessor shall determine the amount of the rollback tax by
computing the difference for the rollback period described in Subsection (3)(b)
between:
(i) the tax paid while the land was assessed under this part; and
(ii) the tax that would have been paid had the property not been
374831-3554-8419.7
assessed under this part.
(b) For purposes of this section, the rollback period is a time period that:
(i) begins on the later of,
(A) the date the land is first assessed under this part; or
(þ) five years preceding the day on which the county assessor
mails the notice required by Subsection (5); and
(ii) ends the day on which the county assessor mails the notice
required by Subsection (5).
(+) (a) The county treasurer shall:
(i) collect the rollback tax; and
(ii) after the rollback tax is paid, certiff to the county recorder that the
rollback tax lien on the property has been satisfied by:
(A) preparing a documen tthafcertifies that the rollback tax lien
on the property has been satisfied; and
(B) providing the document described in Subsection
(+)(a)(ii)(A) to the county recorder for recordation.
(b) The rollback tax collected under this section shall:
(i) be paid into the county treasury; and
(ii) be paid by the county treasurer to the various taxing entities pro
rata in accordance with the property tax levies for the current year.
(5) (u) The county assessor shall mail to an owner of the land that is subject to a
rollback tax a notice that:
(i) the land is withdrawn from this part;
(ii) the land is subject to a rollback tax under this section; and
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(iii) the rollback tax is delinquent if the owner of the land does not pay
the tax within 30 days after the day on which the county assessor mails the
notice.
(b) (i) The rollback tax is due and payable on the day the county assessor
mails the notice required by Subsection (5Xu).
(ii) Subject to Subsection (7),the rollback tax is delinquent if an
owner of the land that is withdrawn from this part does not pay the rollback
tax within 30 days after the day on which the county assessor mails the
notice required by Subsection (5Xa).
(6) (a) Subject to Subsection (6)(b), the following are alien on the tand assessed
under this part:
(i) the rollback tax; and
(ii) interest imposed in accordance with Subsection (7).
(b) The lien described in Subsection (6)(a) shall:
(i) arise upon the imposition of the rollback tax under this section;
(ii) end on the day on which the rollback tax and interest imposed in
accordance with Subsection(7) are paid in full; and
(iii) relate back to the first day of the rollback period described in
Subsection (3Xb).
(7) (a) A delinquent rollback tax under this section shall accrue interest:
(i) from the date of delinquency until paid; and
(ii) at the interest rate established under Section 59-2-1331and in
effect on January I of the year in which the delinquency occurs.
(b) A rollback taxthat is delinquent on September 1 of any year shall be
included on the notice required by Section 59-2-1317, alongwith interest
calculated on that delinquent amount through November 30 of the year in
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which the notice under Section 59-2-l3ll is mailed.
(S) (a) Land that becomes ineligible for assessment under this part only as a result
of an amendment to this part is not subject to the rollback tax if the owner of the
land notifies the county assessor that the land is withdrawn from this part in
accordance with Subsection (2).
(b) Land described in Subsection (8)(a) that is withdrawn from this part as a
result of an event other than an amendment to this part, whether voluntary or
involuntary, is subject to the rollback tax.
(9) Except as provided in Section 5g-2-5ll,land that becomes exempt from
taxation under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 3, is not subject to the
rollback tar if the land meets the requirements of Section 59-2-503 to be assessed
under this part.
(10) (a) Subject to Subsection (10Xb), an owner of land may appeal to the county
board of equalization:
(i) a decision by a county assessor to withdraw land from assessment
under this part; or
(ii) the imposition of a rollback tax under this section.
(b) An owner shall file an appeal under Subsection (10)(a) no later than 45
days after the day on which the county assessor mails the notice required by
Subsection (5).
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